|
With respect to appellate litigation, the IMLA Legal Advocacy
Program serves IMLA members and their governmental clients as an evaluation
center, as an information outlet and in some cases as an amicus in
litigation considered to have a significant impact on a substantial number of
local governments on a national basis. IMLA is the service organization of
primary resort for its members in all cases in which a party to a case before
the United States Supreme Court is represented by an IMLA member. The issues in
these lawsuits range from the constitutional allocation of power between state
and local governments and the federal government to challenges to the
regulatory authority of governments based on civil and individual rights. Take
a look at our amicus activity for 2012 so far.
If you want to contact IMLA about possible participation in your
case, contact Tagg Hutchinson at
This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it
or 202-466-5424 x7112.
Filed September 13, 2012 (petition-stage
brief)
L.A. Cnty. Flood
Control Dist. v. NRDC
READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Author:
Sarah Shalf, Emory Law School Supreme Court
Advocacy Program
To
control flooding and prevent potential property damage, The City of Los
Angeles, like many cities across the country, created a network Municipal
Separate Storm Sewer System (MS4s). These channelized improvements to
surface water flow are necessary to prevent catastrophic losses in the event of
a natural disaster. The Ninth Circuit recently held that these man-made
improvements constitute a “point source” under the Clean Water Act, even when
they do not divert or alter the water source in any way, but merely channelize
it for flood prevention. This redefinition of what constitutes a “point
source” conflicts with prior Supreme Court case law, and opens up municipal
governments who operate MS4 waterways to strict liability for any discharge
that passes through their gates, regardless of whether the discharge occurred
upstream and outside of their control. The ruling places cities in the
untenable position of having to assume liability for all pollutants flowing
through the MS4s they maintain, or forego developing flood control systems that
protect the lives and property of their citizens.
Filed May 16, 2012 (petition-stage brief)
Redevelopment
Authority of Montgomery v. R&J Holding READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Author: Robert J. Tribeck
There
is a long drawn-out history to this case, which we invite you read about on our
blog here . In
short, this a case about the intersection of a number of land use doctrines,
including the Williamson doctrine, issue/claim preclusion, and the England
reservation. For those familiar with land use law, it goes without saying
that these are some of the more controversial issues in land use (for
plaintiffs). However, at the end of the day, there needs to be finality to
litigation. This case has already taken 15 years and cost the Authority
countless dollars. Allowing two bites at the apple will only cost the Authority
more time and money. The Supreme Court itself states in cases like these “we
apply our normal assumption that the weighty interests in finality and comity
trump the interest in giving losing litigants access to an additional appellate
tribunal.” San Remo.
Filed February 10, 2012 (petition-stage
brief)
City of Hugo v. Buchanan READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Authors: Janet Spugnardi & Andrew Messer
While
this case deals with a number of issues like water rights, the issue on appeal
is one of standing. The City of Hugo (Oklahoma) entered into an agreement with
the City of Irving (Texas) for the sale of water. This agreement was prohibited
under Oklahoma law and Hugo was denied a permit to effectuate the agreement by
the state water board. Hugo sued, and the lower court ruled that the City of
Hugo did not have standing to sue its parent-state (political subdivision
standing doctrine). IMLA, Texas Municipal League and Texas Municipal Attorneys
Association jointly filed a brief in this case.
Filed February 08, 2012 (petition-stage
brief)
Comite de Jornaleros v. City of Redondo Beach READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Author: Scott Howard
The
City's roadside solicitation law was enacted back in the 1980s because of all
the traffic/safety problems associated with day laborers soliciting employment
from moving cars. The law was not limited to day laborers, and barred any
individual from standing on a street or highway and soliciting, or attempting
to solicit employment, business, or contributions from an occupant of any motor
vehicle. The definition of street included sidewalks, parkways, medians, alleys
and curbs. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the City's solicitation ordinance was
unconstitutional in that although it was content neutral, it was not narrowly
tailored. The Ninth Circuit decision features
one of the harshest dissents we've read. It's worth reading.
Filed February 06, 2012 (merits-stage brief)
Armour v. City of
Indianapolis READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Authors: Lowell Schiller,
Quin Sorenson & John Meiser
A
group of property owners brought an equal protection claim against the City of
Indianapolis due to the City's decision to provide tax relief only on a
prospective basis. Prior to 2005, the City would finance sewer projects by
apportioning the costs to property owners. The City allowed owners to pay in
full or by installments (10, 20, 30 year options). At some point, the City
decided to move away from this method of financing and moved to a completely
different system and made the decision to forgive the remaining amounts owed
under the old system. However, the affected owners had not all paid the same
amount since some homeowners had paid in full while some had opted for the
longest term financing possible.
IMLA
has submitted a brief in this case to emphasize that the City's actions meet
the rational basis standard. City's have reasonable, legitimate and even
compelling reasons for differentiating between tax refunds and prospective tax
relief. We invite you to read this excellent brief.
Filed January 2012 (merits-stage brief)
Reichle v. Howards READ BRIEF HERE
IMLA
signed on with the State and Local Legal Center on a case with the following
question: Can a person who is arrested upon probable cause is barred from
bringing a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim against the arresting
officer? In this case, Steven Howards was visiting an outdoor shopping mall
when he found out that Vice President Dick Cheney would be making an
appearance. Undercover Secret Service was on the scene, and one member of the
team overheard Howards speaking into his cell phone, "I'm going to ask him
how many kids he's killed today." Mr. Howards did approach the Vice
President, touched him on the shoulder, and told him his policies in Iraq were
disgusting.
Howards
walked away, but he was stopped by Agent Reichle. Agent Reichle asked Howards
if he had touched the Vice President. Howards responded untruthfully that he
hadn't and tried to walk away. Howards was arrested for harassment, held for a
few hours, and released.
Howards
brought an action against the Secret Service agents alleging that he was
arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and in
retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the agents were entitled to qualified
immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim, as Howards had lied (which in this
case, triggered a federal statute). However, the Tenth Circuit held that
Howards could pursue a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim despite the
fact that agents had probable cause to arrest Howard.
Filed January 03, 2012 (petition-stage brief)
Arlington (TX) v. Frame READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Author: David Canupp
The
cert petition deals with the following question: Does Title II of the ADA
mandate that sidewalks constitute a "service, program or activity"
within the meaning of Title II? This case presents an important issue for
municipalities if a plaintiff comes across a cracked sidewalk or broken curb,
they do not have to allege (under the 5th Circuit's decision) that they were
denied access to any particular program or service of the city. It is IMLA's
position that any city has a duty to provide an accessible route to its
programs, but the route itself is not a program. To require a locality to fix
each and every crack would require a municipality to devote a unbalanced
percentage limited fiscal resources to fixing sidewalks.
Filed December 30, 2011 (4th Circuit Court of
Appeals)
Bowden v. Town of
Cary READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono Authors: John Baker , Patrick Flanagan
, Dana Maine , Randall Morrison
Sign
cases are almost by default controversial. There are numerous aspects of the
First Amendment that come in to play, but yet, it is important that localities
retain the authority to regulate on a content-neutral basis. This is such a
case.
Filed December 28, 2011 (merits-stage brief)
Magner v. Gallagher READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Authors: Kevin Decker & Amie Penny
Like
many cities, St. Paul has a property maintenance code which establishes minimum
standards for all structures, including provision on light, ventilation,
heating, sanitation, fire safety, etc. In 2002, St. Paul's Department of
Neighborhood Housing and Property Improvement (DNHPI) increased the level of
code enforcement and targeted rental properties. DNHPI employed a number of
strategies, including issuing orders to abate conditions, condemnations,
vacant-building registrations, fees for excessive consumption of municipal
services, and if necessary, court action.
Plaintiffs
in this case were landlords, with portfolios ranging from one to over forty
properties. These landlords received the code enforcement citations. Plaintiffs
claimed that they suffered increased maintenance costs and fees because of code
enforcement. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals held that these landlords could
bring a disparate impact claim under the FHA, because the increased cost of
repaid tended to increase rents, thereby disproportionately reducing the
housing options for people of color. Plaintiffs were not required to show that
the policy or practice was formulated with discriminatory intent; they simply
had to show that "a facially neutral policy had a significant adverse
impact on members of a protected minority group."
Filed November 21, 2011 (merits-stage brief)
Filarsky v. Delia READ BRIEF HERE
Delia
brought a Section 1983 action against, the City of Rialto, a number of its
employees, and importantly in this case, a private attorney hired to conduct an
interview with Delia. Delia alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights,
and the 9th Circuit granted qualified immunity to all the defendants, EXCEPT
for the private attorney, Filarsky. Because Filarsky is not a government
employee, the 9th Circuit ruled that there was no special reason to extend
governmental immunity to private parties similarly situated. IMLA participated
in this case because local government entities rely on outside counsel
regularly in performing day-to-day activities and for roles that are very
specific in nature. Private lawyers who are acting on the government's behalf
should not be denied the protections while they are working side-by-side with
government lawyer, simply because they are not employed by the local entity. A
ruling against Filarsky would certainly have the consequence of affecting a
government entity's ability to retain high-quality counsel and would also
likely increase municipal costs in a time when localities can least afford
additional financial burdens. IMLA signed onto an amicus brief submitted by the
National School Boards Association.
Filed September 16, 2011 (merits-stage brief)
Rehberg v. Paulk READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Author: Lawrence Rosenthal
Rehberg
sent a number of anonymous faxes to a local hospital, criticizing the
management of the hospital. Paulk was a public investigator in the District
Attorneys office who started investigating Rehberg as a "favor" to
the hospital. Eventually, Rehberg was indicted three times by a grand jury,
where Paulk was the only or one of two witnesses in front of the grand jury.
Each time, Rehberg successfully challenged the grand jury indictment and the
indictments were dismissed. Rehberg brought a Section 1983 action against,
among others, Paulk for malicious investigation/prosecution and claiming that
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because he had been arrested under
the "malicious" indictments. The Question Presented in front of the
Supreme Court is an interesting one: "Whether a law enforcement official
sued for an allegedly unreasonable search and seizure resulting from testimony
in front of a grand jury that allegedly failed to provide probable cause should
be denied testimonial immunity on the theory that the official is properly
analogized to a complaining witness who could be sued at common law for the
tort of malicious prosecution."
Filed August 25, 2011 (petition-stage brief)
City of San Leandro
v. Int'l Church of the Foursquare Gospel READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Authors: Howard D. Cohen & Michael
Sullivan
This
is a RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act) case. The
petition asks the Supreme Court to resolve: 1. Whether cost and/or inconvenience can be sufficient for a
religious landowner to prove that an adverse land use or zoning decision
imposes a “substantial burden” under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006); 2. Whether
case-by-case analysis of a land use application constitutes an “individualized
assessment” under the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2006); 3. Whether
neutral, generally applicable planning principles may be a “compelling
interest” of local governments under the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(a)(1)(A) (2006).
Filed August 25, 2011 (merits-stage brief)
Florence v. Brd. of
Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington READ BRIEF HERE
IMLA
signed on to an amicus effort headed by the City and County of San Francisco.
In short, the issue is whether or not a visual strip search for an arrestee
before being placed with the general jail population (regardless of pretrial,
conviction, offense type) is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. In
1979, the Supreme Court decided Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979),
which upheld a jail policy requiring a visual strip search of every inmate
(pretrial and convicted) after every contact visit from a person outside the
jail. Since Bell, some circuits now hold that arrestees charged with
minor offenses may not be strip searched unless the prison has a reasonable
suspicion that the arrestee is concealing a weapon or other contraband. IMLA
believes that to ensure the safety of jail personnel, visitors, other inmates,
local jail official need to be able to visually strip search arrestees before
they enter the general jail population.
Filed August 23, 2011 (Texas Supreme Court)
Dallas v. Stewart READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Author: Marianne
Landers Banks, Assistant City Attorney, Springfield, MO
This
is an interesting case. Steward bought a house and abandoned it in 1991. For
over 10 years, the house was a common stop for code enforcement officials, for
vagrants, and for complaints by neighbors. One neighbor even testified that an
old tree had fallen from Stewart's lot onto her causing $8,000 worth of damage
and threatened to do $30,000 more. In September 2001, ten years after Stewart
abandoned the house, the Dallas Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board, a thirty
member administrative body, met to decide whether Stewart's house was a
nuisance that should be abated. Eventually, the Board voted in favor of
demolishing the home. Shortly after, a code inspector when to Stewart's home
and found that she had not repaired the property. The City obtained a
demolition warrant. Stewart appealed the Board's decision to district court,
but the district court upheld the Board's decision. The property was
demolished. Shortly after, Stewart brought an action, in part, including a due
process and unconstitutional takings claim. The court ruled in favor of
Stewart, saying that despite all the notice and opportunity to repair her home,
she was entitled to a de novo review of her claims in court, rather than a
determination by the administrative board and a affirmance under a substantial
evidence standard by the reviewing court.
Filed March 31, 2011 (merits-stage brief)
Nevada Ethics
Commission v. Carrigan READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Authors: David Barber,
Ashley Martinez, Elisabeth Kaylor, Molly Shortall (Arlington City Attorney's
Office)
Carrigan
was an elected councilmember. In 2005, the city held public hearings regarding
a proposed large-scale casino/hotel development. One of the consultants for the
casino was also Carrigan's former campaign manager. Carrigan solicited the City
Attorney on how to handle the situation. The City Attorney recommended that
Carrigan did not need to abstain from voting, but he did need to disclose his
prior relationship with the consultant, which he did. The Nevada Ethics
Commission censured Carrigan for not recusing himself, basing its decision on a
Nevada law that required elected officials to abstain from voting in situations
with the following relationships: 1) another member of the official's
household; 2) someone related by blood or marriage; 3) an employer; 4) engaged
in a business relationship; and 5) a relationship 'substantially similar' to
the first four relationships. It was this "catch-all" category that
was used to reprimand Carrigan. Carrigan brought a challenge under the First
Amendment, claiming that the ethics law violated his protected political
speech, was overbroad, vague and constituted a prior restraint. IMLA participated
in favor of Carrgian in this case because we felt that the law was too vague,
and confuses officials (and the local government attorneys who advise them) as
to when to abstain from voting.
Filed February 7, 2011 (merits-stage brief)
Fox v. Vice READ BRIEF HERE
Pro Bono
Author: Pierre Bergeron
The
Town of Vinton Louisiana was part of Section 1983 action in suit arising out of
a heated election for Chief of Police. A federal court ultimately ruled that
all of the plaintiff's federal claims were frivolous but there were other state
law claims deemed not frivolous. The Town then sought and won attorneys fees on
the frivolous claims. Mr. Fox appealed, claiming that the Town was not a
"prevailing defendant" because there were still state law claims yet
to be resolved. IMLA joined this case arguing that the fees here were properly
awarded -- both because the inclusion of even one non-frivolous claim does not
insulate a plaintiff from attorney fee liability for frivolous claims, and
because the lower court had properly attributed the fees to the frivolous
claims. IMLA joined this case because if Mr. Fox prevailed in this case, a
plaintiff need only include one non-frivolous claim and can include numerous
frivolous claims and still emerge unscathed from attorney fee liability. Cities
fiscal resources are limited, and while cities accept the responsibility of
defendant non-frivolous claims, taxpayers should not have to pay for cities to
defend clearly frivolous claims.
Older Legal Advocacy Amicus Activity
District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District
v. Osborne (DNA Testing/Due Process/Federalism)
Salazar v. Buono (First Amendment)
Ricci v. DeStefano (Title VII & Equal Protection
Clause)
Pleasant Grove v. Summum (Speech)
Albuquerque Common Partnership v. City of Albuquerque
(Property - Takings Litigation)
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City
of New York
Naser Jewelers v. City of Concord (First Amendment -
Billboards)
|